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The history of the non-Buddhist world's encounter with that set of 
phenomena lumped together under the rubric of "Buddhism" is a long 
one, though one to which few reliable and readable guides exist. One 
of the best undoubtedly remains Henri de Lubac's La Rencontre du 
Bouddhisme et de l'Occident, 1 which has the merit of considering both 
scholarly and popular "meetings." Philip Almond's new contribution is 
considerably more limited in scope than Lubac's; as its title suggests, it 
is basically a history documenting the British encotmter with informa- 
tion and ideas about Buddhism in the Victorian period. This history is 
sketched through the collection and interpretation of an impressive 
amount of data from original documents of the period. Yet Almond's 
book also proposes (or, as I shall suggest, adopts from elsewhere) a 
thesis about intellectual colonialism and imperialism and the effects 
this has had on all thinking about Buddhism during and since 
Victorian times. The evidence collected and the observations offered 
by Almond strongly point to the need for some serious reevaluation of 
a number of ideas about Buddhism current today. These are ideas 
which, as Almond shows, we moderns have inherited from our 
predecessors without a sufficient awareness of the factors which 
motivated those ideas to begin with. 
An examination of the presuppositions behind Almond's own work, 
however, reveals other equally deeply ingrained ideas, ideas which 
likewise underlie much of the reasoning and argumentation of contem- 
porary discourses on Buddhism. A careful look at Almond's work, 
therefore, will provide us an opportunity to gaze both backwards at 
our heritage and inwards at our own preconceptions. 
In contrast to what could be seen as something of a companion 
volume, The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century, 2 
Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 :171- -  196, 1994. 
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which contains mostly original materials with about fifty pages of 
interpretive preamble, Almond avoids lengthy quotations, preferring to 
sample a large number of different works, providing inter alia some 
analyses of the mass of data he has gathered together. The focus of his 
study is solidly on material that formed contemporary popular 
opinion, rather than on specialist discourse or works that might be 
identified as important milestones only in retrospect but which had 
little popular impact at the time. 
The main thesis of Almond's work may be characterized as the idea 
that one can identify a two-fold position for Buddhism in Victorian 
England. On the one hand Buddhism was a tool used by various 
groups and individuals to promote certain social, political or religious 
agendas, with respect to both English domestic and foreign (or 
perhaps better colonial) policies. On the other hand, the corollary to 
this is that Buddhism itself was transformed or even "created" in the 
context of its utility vis-h-vis those agendas --  it was brought into 
being in the Victorian world for the Victorian world. There was a 
marked tendency for these agendas to both overlap and be set off one 
against the other. An important factor which in part allowed this 
whole process was an at least implicit awareness among scholars and 
students of Buddhism of a gap between Buddhist literature and 
doctrine and contemporary Buddhist practice. This book, a treasure- 
trove of data and materials for the study of the Western reception of 
Buddhism, is full of insightful and fascinating observations. In 
particular, Almond's sensitivity to the ideological pressures which have 
helped shape the modern  understanding of Buddhism, not only in the 
West but via the West in Asia as well, makes this book stimulating 
and important. 
Almond has outlined the plan of his book succinctly, and a good 
place to begin may be with an examination of his own characterization 
of his venture (p. 4): 
In the first place, I want to argue that there was an imaginative creation of Buddhism 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, and that the Western creation of Buddhism 
progressively enabled certain aspects of Eastern cultures to be defined, delimited, and 
classified. In the second place, I want to analyze the discourse about Buddhism that 
was created and sustained by the reification of the term 'Buddhism', and which, in its 
turn, defined the nature and content of this entity. I hope to show the way in which 
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'Buddhism' was created, and discourse about it determined, by the Victorian culture 
in which it emerged as an object of discourse. 
In so doing, something of the history of Buddhist studies in the West, and 
especially in Great Britain, will be thrown into re l ie f . . . ,  part of the purpose of this 
book is to demonstrate as precisely as possible the way in which the scholarly analysis 
of Buddhism was influenced by the object it created, and the discourse that defined 
that object. Buddhist scholarship was not only the cause but also the effect of that 
which it brought into being --  Buddhism. 
Almond seems to suggest not only that the way in which Europeans 
were able to talk about Buddhism, but the very existence of that 
"Buddhism" itself, were both products of the Victorian cultural 
background of those Europeans. Is it really so that Buddhist scholar- 
ship "brought [Buddhism] into being"? A few pages later, Almond 
again states his goals and, explicitly, his presuppositions (pages 5--6): 
I am not concerned with the extent to which Victorian interpretations of Buddhism 
correctly or incorrectly perceived, selected, reflected on, and interpreted the congeries 
of texts, persons, events and phenomena in various cultures that it classified as 
Buddhist. My concern is rather with how these were presented by the West, in the 
West, and primarily for the West . . . .  Central to my argument, then, is the presupposi- 
tion that the construction and interpretation of Buddhism reveals much about 
nineteenth-century concerns and can be read as an important sign of crucial socio- 
cultural aspects of the Victorian period . . . .  Consequently, in the chapters which 
follow, discourse about Buddhism has been examined not only with a view to 
discerning the way in which the image of an alien religiosity- was constructed, but also 
with the aim of demonstrating the way in which the discourse thus constructed 
illuminates the broad socio-cultural context in which it was created. Discourse about 
Buddhism p r o v i d e s . . ,  a mirror in which was reflected an image not only of the 
Orient, but of the Victorian world also. 
There is a subtle fallacy here that may reveal something of the 
theoretical underpinnings of Almond's discussions. Almond claims not 
to be interested in the relationship between the objective truth of 
Buddhism's existence and situation and the Victorian interpretation of 
that objective existence. He is interested in how the texts, persons and 
so forth in Buddhist cultures were presented, or in other words 
interpreted, in the West. Unless I have missed something, this does 
not make sense. If it is assumed that "the construction and interpreta- 
tion of Buddhism reveals much about nineteenth-century concerns," 
then it is necessarily true that "Buddhism" exists outside of and 
independent of those nineteenth-century concerns, through the lens of 
w h i c h  i t  ix i n t e . r n r a t a d  T h a r o  r m l ~ t  h ~  n R n c l c t h i e m  xx~hi~,h ec~m~ n ~ c m l o  
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and some works of scholarship are able to reflect more accurately, 
honestly and directly than are others. The final phrase quoted above 
repeats this idea: Looking at how people talked about Buddhism 
makes it possible for us to see in their discussions not only a reflec- 
tion of the Orient, the home of Buddhism, but also a reflection of 
their contemporary world from the standpoint of which they observe 
that Buddhism. Here is the essentialist fallacy: How can we talk about 
how a person or group of persons interpreted a notion without any 
base line with which to compare that interpretation? The "how" of the 
phrase "how these were presented by the W e s t . . . "  assumes some 
standard against which to judge, some if not objective then at least 
more objective standpoint. Almond's presentation of course must and 
does make just such assumptions, although he appears to want to deny 
this. 
The first chapter of Almond's book, "The discovery of Buddhism," 
begins with an introductory sketch of Western contacts with Buddhist 
phenomena in "the Orient." Following this brief discussion Almond 
(p. 12) makes explicit what was implied in the passage quoted above: 
Throughout the preceding discussion, I have tried carefully to avoid giving the 
impression that Buddhism existed prior to the end of the eighteenth century: that it 
was waiting in the wings, so to say, to be discovered; that it was floating in some 
aethereal Oriental limbo expecting its objective embodiment. On the contrary, what 
we are witnessing in the period from the later part of the eighteenth century to the 
beginning of the Victorian period in the latter half of the 1830s is the creation of 
Buddhism. It becomes an object, is constituted as such; it takes form as an entity that 
'exists' over against the various cultures which can now be perceived as instancing it, 
manifesting it, in an enormous variety of ways. 
This formulation is essentially incompatible with the rest of 
Almond's argument. Perhaps it might be better to state it this way: 
Prior to the end of the eighteenth century, there was no Buddhism in 
the European imagination. For Europeans, Buddhism did not exist in 
the sense that the world they knew did not include among its many 
objects one called "Buddhism." But at a certain point the idea of such 
an object gradually "congealed," and became an object; "Buddhism" 
was created in and for the Western imagination. Historically speaking, 
of course, Buddhists in Asia, to the extent that they have been aware 
of the existence of others who share their faith but manifest it in a 
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different fashion, have historically "created" Buddhism all along. In 
this sense, it is a question of identity. It may be possible from one 
point of view to refer to this as a difference between an internal 
creation and an external and adventitious one, an emic view and an 
eric one, to use modern jargon. This ambiguous ontological status 
of Buddhism was at least hinted at as early as 1909 by Louis de 
la Vall6e Poussin, who in a discussion of the "many species of 
Buddhism" observed that "Buddhism, to speak as do the meta- 
physicians, does not exist 'in itself' and by itself. ''3 To use a notion 
made explicit in Indian philosophy, but probably implicit in much 
Western thinking and perhaps in Almond's formulation of his 
problem, to exist in itself means to have a single, unchanging nature. If 
"Buddhism" existed, it could not be many things but only one, and it 
could not change through time or place. This idea lies at the root of 
the Buddhist philosophical rejection of "self," and at the root of our 
acceptance of the idea that Buddhism need not be "floating in some 
aethereal Oriental limbo" to nevertheless pre-exist its "creation" in a 
Western discourse. There need not be an ideal Buddhism (in a 
Platonic sense) for there to be some Buddhisms. It is possible to 
suggest that "a" Buddhism, or even better yet "Buddhisms," were 
created by Europeans and inevitably for Europeans in the eighteenth 
century, but this creation was hardly, as Almond sometimes seems to 
suggest, ex nihilo. One cannot proceed with the idea that it is possible 
to ignore the question of how far the Victorian interpreters correctly 
or incorrectly understood their object. 
On the other hand, our very judgment of the accuracy of the 
Victorian interpreters of Buddhism immediately calls into question our 
own standpoint; how do we know when the Victorians presented a 
view more or less in concord with indigenous realities, in other words, 
a "correct understanding," and when they were responding more than 
anything else to their own historical situation? It is a fruitless excercise 
in conceit, however, to look down upon those comments of our 
predecessors with which we cannot agree as if we have necessarily 
attained some higher standpoint. If we want to understand how far our 
inherited ideas are justifiable in light of contemporary presumptions, it 
may be even more profitable, for example, to turn things around and 
examine those ideas inherited from former ages with which we do 
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agree, and to try to see if we can actually follow the reasoning which 
led to the acceptance of these opinions. We will no doubt be surprised 
at the amount of revision in our own opinions we find this examina- 
tion to necessitate. 4 
Almond's suggestion of the importance of the Victorian world's role 
in the "creation" of Buddhism is based on his thesis about ideological 
imperialism. The evidence for this thesis comes from an examination 
of the discourse within which that creative process was expressed. If 
"Buddhism" is something created by those who think about it, as 
indeed must be true of any concept, it becomes necessary to under- 
stand the circumstances under which, and the pressures in response to 
which, the concept was created and elaborated in any given mifieu. 
This means that we must understand the political situation, social 
stresses and everyday assumptions of that milieu. And equally impor- 
tautly, we must understand our own situation, in order to provide a 
check for ourselves; when might we be responding to our own 
contemporary pressures, rather than reflecting those of the past which 
is the object of our study? 
Although as Almond states (p. 139), "In the Western imagination, 
Buddhism is the most recent of the major world religions, its construc- 
tion and interpretation reaching back a mere century and a half," 
some images of Buddhism did exist in the West before Victorian 
times, and Almond himself and others have studied this history of 
encounter elsewhere. 5 In addition of course we also have available 
some studies on the modern, mostly post-Victorian, shaping of 
Western thought about Buddhism and some of its principal aspects. 6 
The creation of Buddhism in the Victorian world, a process through 
which Westerners (a concept perhaps a bit more problematic than 
Almond seems to admit) classified diverse phenomena together within 
a discourse about "Buddhism," is divided by Almond into two periods: 
The first is that in which Buddhism is "out there," geographically, 
culturally and imaginatively other, but in the present and encounter- 
able. The second is a later period, more or less after 1860, in which 
Buddhism becomes an object locatable in the past, in texts and 
manuscripts, but in the West, in libraries and oriental institutes. There 
is a move here from encountering living Buddhism in a foreign land in 
the present, an encounter which by definition must be to some extent 
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mutual, to appropriating an ancient Buddhism created out of texts, 
texts which can be read but which cannot speak back, cannot contest 
interpretations, cannot assert anything but must bow to control and 
exploitation. 
The key which separates the two periods of Victorian encounter --  
and note that "encounter" certainly implies some object other than 
that created in the West -- is the distinction between "there -- now" 
and "here -- then." We may say that the second period is charac- 
terized by a "textualization' of Buddhism, its virtual capture and 
confinement in books and libraries. This is a crucial element in the 
Western appropriation of the foreign object "Buddhism." As Almond 
puts it (p. 24), "Through the West's progressive possession of the texts 
of Buddhism, it becomes, so to say, materially owned by the West; 
and by virtue of this ownership, ideologically controlled by it. "7 The 
move from the first chronological period delimited by Almond to the 
second is portrayed (p. 37) as illustrating a progressive bias toward 
domination and objectification. The first period is one in which "the 
beginnings of Western discourse about Buddhism did not hint of 
Buddhism as a decaying, degenerate religion. In the absence of an ideal 
textual Buddhism with which to compare what was encountered in the 
East, it could not. In contrast, those who saw Buddhism in the East in 
the second half of the century could not but measure it against what it 
was textually said to be, could not but find it wanting and express this 
in the language of decay, degeneration, and decadence." The creation 
of an ideal Buddhism out of textual materials allows those who control 
the resources, the texts, to do the creating, since only they can read 
the texts, and this allows them the freedom to prosecute their own 
agendas with the authority of "science." Those scholars who position 
themselves as interpreters of the past define this task (no doubt 
unconsciously) likewise as one of presenting and defending pristine 
orthodoxy, but an orthodoxy which they themselves define. 
The identification of the locus of true, authoritative Buddhism as 
resting in the texts which lie in European libraries axiomatically 
produces a shift in the locus of power. As Almond says (p. 33): 
"Buddhism developed as a 'something' primarily said in the West, 
delimited and designated by virtue of its ideological containment 
within the intellectual, political and religious institutions of the West. 
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Buddhism as it manifested itself in the East could only there be s e e n  
through the medium of what was definitively said about it elsewhere." 
It is therefore through this control over Buddhism's past that the West 
put itself in the position of judging Buddhism in the present -- 
deciding whether or not the contemporary faith of the people over 
whom, in many cases, it held colonial control met the standards set 
in their own past, but a past interpreted for them by their colonial 
masters. 8 This allowed Westerners to (p. 37) "combine a positive 
evaluation of a Buddhism textually located in the West with a negative 
evaluation of its Eastern instances," in other words to, at a stroke, 
appreciate the virtues of Oriental creations, and honor them, while 
simultaneously escaping the necessity of acknowledging that contem- 
porary Asians were heirs to this tradition and likewise worthy of 
respect. 9 
If all of this sounds familiar, it should. For Almond has, virtually 
lock, stock and barrel, adopted the theoretical framework of Edward 
Said's O r i e n t a l i s m .  1~ For Said (p. 3), Orientalism is "the enormously 
systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage 
-- and even produce -- the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, 
ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively, during the post- 
Enlightenment period." Moreover (p. 5), "The relationship between 
Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of 
varying degrees of a complex hegemony . . . .  " A few more phrases 
from Said's book should clarify Almond's debt to it. "Orientalism," 
Said wrote (p. 22), "responded more to the culture that produced it 
than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West." 
And related to (though not identical with) Almond's idea which, 
above, I termed "textualization," Said wrote (p. 52): "[T]he Orient 
studied was a textual universe by and large; the impact of the Orient 
was made through books and manuscripts, not, as in the impress of 
Greece on the Renaissance, through mimetic artifacts like sculpture 
and pottery." It is surprising that, except for a rather brief treatment 
(p. 5), Almond seems not to fully acknowledge his theoretical debt to 
Said. For future reference, it should be kept in mind that the discus- 
sion generated over the years by Said's book might be consulted with 
profit when Almond's theoretical analyses are at issue. 
I mentioned above Almond's claim that in principle it was his 
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intention not to evaluate whether or not a given position adopted or 
criticized by Victorian writers has been repudiated or accepted by 
further Buddhist researches. He has of course been forced into just 
such evaluations since, to over-simplify, without this distinction 
between what we hold to be fact or at least plausible and what we 
reject as ideologically conditoned by prejudices, we become unable to 
separate the historically plausible from the implausible. Without such a 
starting point, we will be unable to locate Victorian prejudice and 
separate it from "objective" reporting. It is necessary not only to 
examine ideological motivations but also the objective bases for what 
is being described. As an example we may refer to a case in which 
Almond may have overlooked the fact that one may be right for 
wrong reasons. That is, although he may well have correctly identified 
the ideological motivations of the author in question, this alone is not 
enough to reject that author's claim. In his discussion (p. 45) of the 
Victorian idea that the Oriental imagination is excessive, Almond 
refers without comment to Ph. Colinet's remarks that no Hindu 
would have imagined that the Buddha could have been conceived 
except to the accompaniment of signs and marvels. Whatever Colinet's 
motivation for saying this, and whatever such an evaluation meant to 
him or others about the "oriental mind" and its excesses, I think that 
at least for those Indians (or "Hindus") who accepted the divinity of 
the Buddha -- a group which no doubt included and probably still 
includes many whom we would consider to be devotees of faiths other 
than Buddhism -- this is a fundamentally correct appreciation or 
characterization of a pre-modern, and still to a large extent contem- 
porary, Indian world-view. Almond may well be right in implying that 
Colinet's statement was motivated by the general view that "the 
oriental mind" is one of childlike ignorance and indolence. But, it is a 
dangerous countermeasure to the prejudice that non-Western or pre- 
modem peoples are children or savages to suggest that they somehow 
share with the modem West a fundamentally similar view of the world 
or conception of reality. This latter idea says much about the ideo- 
logical agendas of our own day which have difficulty in recognizing 
the difference between equality in value and equality in substance. 
If we hesitate to draw distinctions called for by the evidence we 
uncover we make as big an error as if we inject our own ideological 
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agendas into that evidence and draw conclusions not justified by the 
evidence itself. If in evaluating the researches of our predecessors we 
give too much weight to their ideological motivations, we will end up 
throwing out many babies with the bathwater. In some cases, it may be 
better to keep the babies, and just change the water. It is certainly 
necessary to ground our theories, hypotheses and ideas on assump- 
tions with which we agree. And if we find fault with the assumptions, 
and thus the very basis of the reasoning, of our predecessors, we must 
certainly re-evaluate their conclusions. At the same time, having 
replaced old and unacceptable assumptions with our own, the sub- 
sequent reasoning and derived conclusions may still end up resembling 
those originally called into question by our re-evaluation. This may 
seem then like a waste of time. But in each case, until we actually go 
through the process, we will not know which conclusions we can keep 
and which must be rejected. 
One of the central foci of any thinking about Buddhism is certainly 
the Buddha himself, and thus a natural question to begin with is, Who 
was the Buddha? It is here that, naturally, many of the ideas central to 
the Victorian conception of Buddhism come together, and it is here in 
his discussion of the Buddha that Almond's investigations mark some 
of their greatest advances over the works of others who have covered 
more or less the same ground. For 19th century people, Almond 
holds: 
The Buddha of mid and late Victorian times is locatable in history through his 
contemporary textual presence. He is an object conceptually related to a developing 
naturalistic view of the universe, to an emergent critical view of the Bible, to an India 
under British hegemony, to a world view increasingly determined by a geologically 
and biologically based chronology and progressively less by a Biblical chronology and 
cosmology. The Buddha is very much a human figure; one to be compared not with 
the gods, but with other historical personalities --  with Jesus, Mohammed, or Luther. 
In contrast to this very human image, the Buddha of pre-Victorian times was located, 
primarily, not in history but in a realm beyond -- a realm populated by the gods of 
India, of Greece, and of Egypt. Sometimes, he was more mundanely located; but even 
then it was in a place and time the parameters of which were determined by inter- 
pretations of biblical cosmology and biblical chronology. (p. 56) 
The Victorian Buddha described here exists in texts, not through 
observation of who or what the Buddha may have been to living 
Buddhists in Asia. Whether he is god or man, he is "processed" 
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according to European categories and interpreted according to 
European agendas. It is interesting to realize that it is only in the last 
few years that things are starting to change a little bit in Buddhist 
Studies in this regard, with increased attention being given to anthro- 
pological studies of Buddhist cultures, and new attempts to look at old 
evidence from the ancient past: 1 Probably these new ways of looking 
at things have not yet filtered much into the common wisdom, either 
of Buddhist scholars or of students of Buddhism at large. 
Looking backwards, the earliest attempts to locate the Buddha 
mythologically were based in large part on etymological analyses. This 
type of analysis has its background in early modern ideas about the 
Bible and history, and most especially the connection of language with 
this history. The legend of the Tower of Babel was taken very seri- 
ously, and early attempts to place Asian languages within such a 
Biblical framework determined much of the early discourse about the 
history of Asia, Asian culture and social institutions, and the relation 
between the latter and those of Europe. This is a history which 
Almond does not explore, 12 preferring to concentrate upon the details 
of etymological and mythological identifications of the Buddha with, 
most notably, the Nordic Woden. These etymological and mythological 
fantasies make amusing reading today, and it is easy to forget how 
seriously this type of research was taken. Indeed, with only a touch of 
modern day chauvinism we can call such early efforts "proto-scien- 
tific," for they were the precursors of modem comparative philology. 
But at the same time we should not forget that, as great as some of 
the proponents of such comparative excesses were, they did not go 
uncriticised even by their contemporaries. A very humourous essay 
published in Dublin in 1870 "proves," using the methods of compara- 
tive mythology and etymology, that the famous F. Max Miiller, editor 
of the Rgveda and of the series "Sacred Books of the East," one of the 
fathers of modem Comparative Religion and Buddhist Studies, and 
not at all coincidentally a strong and influential advocate of the 
"comparative" approach, was not a true human being but rather a 
personification of the sun. The argument is most convincing! 13 That 
such a sarcastic and tongue-in-cheek critique of the comparative 
method was far from irrelevant or anachronistic one has only to 
observe that a few years after the publication of this article Emile 
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Senart was to publish his Essai sur la l~gende du Buddha, 14 in which 
he attempted to prove that the Buddha was in fact a solar deity. And 
Senart was by no means the only scholar to hold such a position. 15 
In the evolution of ideas about the Buddha himself, once again the 
dividing line falls around 1860.16 Before this time the Buddha was a 
divine being located in mythical time; afterwards he became a his- 
torical figure and an object of "objective" history. In this context 
Almond discusses (p. 67ff) the influence of European studies of the 
life of Jesus on contemporary studies of the life of the Buddha. It is 
usual to repeat the fairly obvious assertions of a connection between 
the European awareness of the fragile historicity of their own God 
and that of an alien savior, but Almond shows clearly and concisely 
who said what, and what their motivations were for saying so. It is one 
of the strengths of this book that Almond rarely stops short of 
suggesting what motivations may have led to a given position, and it is 
out of this search for motivations that Almond's outline of ideological 
pressures grows. 
One importance of the Buddha for the Victorian polemicist, 
Almond points out, was the use to which he could be put in the 
project to create --  out there -- the ideal Victorian gentleman, this 
figure being dressed in the clothes of the polernicist's own choice. 
Having created one's ideal model, one "discovers" it and its existence 
proves the correctness of one's own position. This is a view in 
miniature of the whole ideological imaginative creation of Buddhism 
itself. Within a British colonial context it was mainly as a counter to 
the predominant Hindu system in India that the Buddha could be of 
use. The Buddha thus created was an opponent of caste, and of the 
priestly system which supported it, an advocate of social reform. This 
social reform, then, is the project of the polemicist who creates this 
Buddha, a Buddha who in fact becomes a Martin Luther of India; the 
fatter point supports of course a strong anti-Catholic polemic at home 
in Europe. But then something odd happens: the Buddha is no longer 
a social reformer. This %vas, in effect, the result of an attempt to 
protect the Victorian Buddha from being perceived as an early 
proponent of those forms of socialism that were perceived by many as 
threatening the structure of English society from the beginning of the 
1880s especially." (p. 75) The transformation which has taken place is 
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as follows (p. 76): "in a context of anti-Catholicism, a radical social 
reformer rejecting the pretensions of a priestly ruling class could be 
embraced. But in a context of anti-Socialism, a radical social reformer 
rejecting the pretentions of the secular ruling class was unacceptable. 
The Buddha, too culturally powerful to be simply ignored, was moved 
to the right wing of the political spectrum." The polemicist, when the 
dynamic of his own polemic shifts, gives the Buddha a new set of 
clothes better suited to the times. 
The Buddha, a symbol created by Europeans, is of course therefore 
a symbol manipulated by Europeans. But this last statement may also 
mean that at certain times our own contemporary views of the Buddha 
will correspond more closely to former views that they do at other 
times, depending in part on the degree to which our ideology agrees 
with that of former times. Especially if we accept the idea that the 
historical Buddha ~fikyamuni, a man who lived in India in perhaps 
the fifth century before the Common Era, is essentially historically 
unknowable --  because, most importantly, we have no certain 
evidence even that such a man lived -- then there is no actual "fact" 
or set of "facts" to which any picture of the Buddha might correspond. 
There have been many attempts to write de-mythologized lives of 
Jesus, but the entire enterprise has been rightly criticized as logically 
confused. Similar attempts have been made to discover a historical 
Buddha, Iv and these share the same problems. So our Buddha, 
anyone's Buddha (Buddhists included), can only be a Buddha of some 
portion of the multifarious Buddhist tradition, or a Buddha of our 
own making. Again, if we consider "the Buddha", as religiously we 
must, not as a historical man but as an enlightened being, logically the 
access to such a one is not through history. Any adjudication of the 
picture of such a being must come from elsewhere. But even if we aim 
at understanding how the enlightened Buddha was understood by 
others, I suggested above that it is necessary to posit an essentialist 
basis without which we cannot evaluate any argument. There are 
better and worse descriptions of an object because, however ultimately 
unknowable in its essence, there is an object which by its presence 
restricts what can be said about it. No matter how unknowable the 
Buddha, some statements are more plausible than others. Be this as it 
may, and even if one does not accept this reasoning, as Almond 
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clearly sees it is still very possible to identify, and learn from, the 
ideological pressures which motivated people to develop certain ideas, 
whether or not we agree with those ideas. Even if we cannot know the 
"truth" of a situation, we can still identify factors which led others to 
hold certain positions. To some extent we can explore the ideology of 
Victorian interpreters of the Buddha, without ourselves being neces- 
sarily quantitatively any more objective than they. 
The manipulation of the Buddha is a captivating case in point. 
Whatever the historical Buddha's social philosophy actually was, or 
whatever, rather, we today believe it to have possibly been, it is still 
possible to trace with Almond's help some of the ways in which 
scholars and polemicists of former times imputed one position or 
another to the venerable figure, with the motivation, Almond has 
shown, of promoting their own positions through the Buddha's 
charismatic authority. With this in mind we can both analyze and 
re-evaluate the traditional understandings we have received, and look 
at the picture contemporary works paint of the Buddha, for example, 
to see how far we can trace the concerns of contemporary social 
agendas within that picture. This may not directly help us to gain 
access to a remote and perhaps unreachable past, but it can clarify for 
us why we believe what we believe, and thus allow us to re-affirm or 
reject those beliefs. 
The interaction between contemporary social, political and religious 
agendas and scholarly or popular dogmas is certainly not limited to 
the discourse of the Victorian period. For example, one of the 
commonly repeated notions about Buddhism in the present day is the 
idea that the Mahftyfina is a lay-oriented movement. Without going 
into detail, and setting aside the question of the "true state of affairs" 
which may or may not be knowable, I think we can hypothesize that 
there are two basic causes which have led to this opinion being widely 
held today. The first is that it is standard doctrine among Japanese 
Buddhist scholars and Buddhist lay believers, and the second is that in 
the West it was the theory espoused by among others (like Edward 
Conze -- for whom the MahfiyS_na was the "new dispensation" -- and 
D. T. Suzuki) one of the most influential modern Buddhist scholars in 
Europe, Etienne Lamotte. To over-simplify matters, in the first case it 
is standard doctrine of several of the most important Japanese 
R E V I E W  A R T I C L E  185 
Buddhist sects, such as the Pure Land Schools and those connected 
with the Lotus Sfitra (Nichiren-shfi, the Reiyukai, and so on), that 
the Mahfiy~x~a is a preaching for the laity, as opposed to the old, 
"t-FmaySna" teaching which is for renunciant monks and nuns. This 
dogma has become, not necessarily with any conscious reflection, 
transformed into and presented as historical fact not only by the 
religious leaders of these sects, but by scholars who belong to these 
sects (which means most Japanese Buddhist scholars), t8 On the other 
hand, while no doubt Lamotte was to some extent influenced by these 
Japanese ideas, as he was by much Japanese Buddhist scholarship 
(despite few references to such in his notes), these are not his only 
influences. As Hubert Durt has recently pointed out: 
There has been a tendency in the study of Mahfiyfina to see the Bodhisattva ideal as a 
concession made by the community of Buddhist monks to the aspirations of the laity. 
This interpretation resulted from several dubious associations: Mah~yfina has 
sometimes been viewed as a movement similar to the Protestant Reformation in 
Europe. Moreover, some authors have been influenced by the typically Latin and 
Roman Catholic opposition between the clerical and the secular world, the secular 
world being divided later into responsible religious laymen (the French "lah'cat") and 
anti-religious or anti-clerical laymen (the French "laicat6," "la'icisme'). ''19 
Durt refers to Lamotte in mentioning those authors who were so 
influenced. 2~ Of course, there is reference in even relatively early 
Mahfiyfina Buddhist literature to the "householder bodhisattva." But 
both the exact meaning of such passages and the extent to which they 
reflect some historical situation must ultimately be evaluated with a 
sensitivity to an ancient Indian situation, avoiding as much as possible 
-- by being aware of them -- prejudices motivated by the ideological 
inheritance of the contemporary researcher. 
I mentioned above the idea that the quest for political control 
was one important factor motivating certain interpretations of 
Buddhism. But the utilization of Buddhism in the Victorian world to 
support or challenge a given dogma extended beyond the realm of 
colonial or political policy. In connection with the question of whether 
mankind owes its existence to a natural process of evolution or to 
divine creation, one of the most hotly debated issues of the day and 
an issue in some quarters not yet put to rest, Almond observes that (p. 
86) "the period during which there occurred the most vehement 
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attacks on the evolutionary account of man correspond with that of 
the most savage criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth." But in 
the end, although the importance of the doctrine of rebirth for the 
Buddhist philosophical system was realized, it seems that generally 
people of the Victorian period were unable to make much sense out 
of it. This did not stop some from making use of the idea, for example 
to support their positions on the doctrine of evolution. But even if 
rebirth was recognized as central to the Buddhist doctrinal vision (for 
without it the doctrine of karma is incoherent), Buddhist cosmology 
was not. No necessary connection was postulated between the truth of 
the Buddhist cosmology and the religious truth of Buddhism as a 
whole, "prompted no doubt from the developing awareness that the 
value of the Christian tradition was not dependent on the truth of its 
cosmology." (p. 93) Since the Bible's cosmology was increasingly 
coming to be rejected and replaced with modern scientific thinking, it 
would have been incautious to insist that Buddhist cosmological ideas 
must guarantee the truth of the whole Buddhist system. If the Bible's 
cosmology was disconnected from the truth of its fundamental 
message, so could be that of the Buddhists. It is the presentation of 
observations such as this and of the evidence supporting such connec- 
tions that allows a clearer picture of Victorian ideology to emerge 
through Almond's midwifery. 
The spirit of the Victorian age can also be seen in the wider quest 
for origins (~ la Darwin), a quest which Almond (p. 95) credits with 
the high value placed on the study of Pfili Buddhism, in contrast to 
Sanskrit (and presumably also East Asian) Buddhism. "Underlying the 
historical quest for origins was the assumption that the original was 
the essential." This assumption of an equation: original -- essential = 
true is still with us to a rather large extent, and has contributed to a 
view that "non-original" Buddhism was necessarily corrupt and false. 
According to Almond (p. 96 if), the belief in Europe that Buddhism 
is essentially theistic was at first connected with a belief in the 
chronological priority of the Mahfiy~na. But after the mid 1870s, 
when it became generally accepted that Pfili Buddhism was older than 
Mah~ty~-aa Buddhism, claims that Buddhism was originally theistic 
disappeared. For those who were themselves not theists, the existence 
of Buddhism and its moral system, a system which was generally even 
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if sometimes reluctantly approved of in the West, allowed them to 
argue then that theism was not a necessary condition upon which to 
ground morality. The response to this move in the polemical contest 
was for the defenders of theism to argue that, after all, Buddhist 
morality was essentially a selfish morality; true selfless morality must 
be grounded in God. Almond (p. 116--7) sees in this more than an 
attempt to defend the citadels of Christianity. "~T]he criticism of 
Buddhist ethics as s e l f i sh . . ,  more crucially, I t h i n k , . . ,  was deter- 
mined by the cultural hegemony of the West over the East. This 
necessitated the view that, however ideal in precept  Buddhist ethics 
might be, in practice it could not but be tmconducive to the main- 
tenance of society." He goes on: 
The polarity of assimilation and rejection of Buddhist ethics among Victorian writers 
is therefore suggestive of the desire of the West ideologically to suppress the 
autonomy of the East, and thus to control it. Buddhist ethical precepts could be and 
were assimilated. But the idea that Buddhist societies failed to put them into practice 
made possible the rejection of the cultural viability of these societies, and validated 
the cultural hegemony of the West. 
This formulation implies the idea that the colonial authorities 
responsible for the "maintenance of society" in Buddhist lands 
somehow manipulated --  perhaps consciously --  this view of Buddhist 
ethics as a tool of administrative control and hegemonic authority, 
even perhaps that there was some sort of conspiracy to promote  a 
certain view of Buddhist ethics for political or even military purposes. 
I doubt very much whether such a position can be maintained in its 
extreme form, and also have reservations about the appeal to sub- 
conscious motivations of Victorian writers on Buddhism. To be sure, 
many writers were indeed connected with various colonial services, 
a connection which continued until quite recently with the t~cole 
Franfaise d'Extr~me-Orient in Indo-China. The connection between 
the political goals of these colonial authorities and their Oriental 
studies and scholarly conclusions must, however, be traced in more 
detail before any conclusions should be drawn. Although Almond's 
researches are certainly an excellent beginning, without individual 
biographies of many figures, it will be impossible to really know what 
motivated any given position, even if general trends can be identified. 
In addition to the utilization of Buddhist theism or non-theism in 
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the moral realm, another tension developed by Victorian polemicists 
was that between two ideological schemes. First we have the following: 
pure, original P~i Buddhism, and decadent, corrupt Mahaykna, versus: 
repressively scholastic early Buddhism, and a later stage (Mahfty~na) 
at which the natural instincts to worship a deity could emerge. That is 
to say, once it was determined that Pftli Buddhism was non-theistic 
and Mah~yfma theistic, there were two ways of thinking about the 
evolution of the idea of theism. One was to see the earlier stage 
(represented by P~li Buddhism) as pure and original --  and rational. A 
second was to view P?ali Buddhism as an early rationalistic stage 
during which logic was employed to suppress the natural human quest 
to recognize the deity. The corollary to this set of views of P?ali 
Buddhism is the alternation between one view of Mahfty~na as later 
and degenerate, and another view of it as a stage of release from the 
scholastic suppression of faith in which worship is acknowledged as 
true religion. Even during Victorian times, to uphold some aspects of 
any of these positions required a selective blindness concerning certain 
ideas which were accepted as historical fact. It is therefore of con- 
siderable interest to notice a recent book by Peter Masefield in which 
it is argued that "Buddhism, or at least Pali Buddhism, far from 
degenerating from a noble and humanistic path of self-improvement 
into a religion distinguished by faith in a higher power, grace and 
revelat ion. . ,  has in fact suffered the reverse fate: it has degenerated 
into a humanistic path of self-improvement. "12 This latter opinion 
probably has little to do with debates over Buddhism and Christian 
theism or the relative value of Pfali and Mahay~na Buddhism, but it 
seems unlikely that even today discussions over the status of revela- 
tion and divinity in Pftli Buddhism have escaped being influenced by 
the forces at work in Victorian times. 
If some of the debates over aspects of Buddhist religiosity or 
institutions were motivated by inter-religious or inter-sectarian 
conflicts in the West, others can be traced to altogether different 
causes. While it is true that some attacks on Buddhist monasticism 
were motivated by anti-Catholic feelings, more generally the attitude 
that monastic isolation is antithetical to the work ethic was apparently 
responsible for this position. It is of interest that Jesuits also leveled 
criticisms against Buddhist monasticism (in China) for its sloth. It 
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seems that while Victorians could on the whole appreciate the active 
side of Buddhism, and especially its ethical system (with the reserva- 
tions mentioned above), they rejected its contemplative side which 
they perceived as an instance of oriental laziness. This appears to be 
very much the opposite of the situation we have today, in an age in 
which Zen, Tibetan Buddhist meditation and Vipassanfi are the areas 
of Buddhism in which Westerners seem to take by far the greatest 
interest. The history of this transformation and the motivations behind 
it are no doubt quite interesting, and perhaps revealing about modern 
attitudes and agendas in the same way that the Victorian critiques of 
monastic quietude inform us about Victorian thinking. 
The polemical environment of the Victorian period which led 
authors to contrast Buddhism -- indeed all other religions -- with 
Christianity, to compare it favorably, to reject it as false, or to see in it 
a preparatory stage for the final truth -- such an environment is a 
thing of the past. If anything, it has been replaced with an attitude, in 
some circles at least, more akin to that of the first Western converts to 
Eastern religions, an attitude which seeks a perfect answer to the 
problems which plague the society in which the convert happens to 
live. This reversed view is equally unbalanced, idealizing the myste- 
rious East, but it responds in the same fashion as earlier prejudices to 
its own contemporary polemical context, and deserves to be examined 
critically. 
In his conclusion (p. 140) Almond summarizes one of his most 
important points by stressing again the dominance of Europe over the 
Orient: 
It was the Victorians who developed the discourse within which Buddhism was 
circumscribed, who deemed it a worthy focus of Western attention; it was they who 
brought forth the network of texts within which Buddhism was located. And it was 
they who determined the framework in which Buddhism was imaginatively con- 
structed, not only for themselves, but also in the final analysis for the East itself. 
The last phrase here is crucial: although Almond never alludes to 
the idea, Agehananda Bharati's concept of the "pizza effect" refers to 
precisely this phenomenon. 22 Briefly put, this label refers to the 
process of the export of a certain cultural artifact from culture A to 
culture B. When the artifact comes to be valued in culture B, the 
importer, those in the culture of origin come to value it too, and 
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reimport it with renewed value, a value much higher than that they 
originally assigned to it. This is tree of the history of pizza in Italy and 
of Buddhism in, for example, Sri Lanka. The latter case has been 
investigated along with many other aspects of the modernization 
of Buddhism in Sri Lanka by Richard Gombrich and Gananath 
Obeyesekere in their delightful and fascinating work Buddhism 
Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka. 23 In that work the 
influence of modern and Western ideas, which includes a renewed 
value placed on Pfili texts, is capsulized with the term "Protestant 
Buddhism." The same term has been taken up by Gregory Schopen 
recently in an attempt to illustrate how such modem ideas have deeply 
influenced contemporary views of ancient Buddhism as well. z4 
Aimond's presentation is primarily that of materials, and he has 
gathered together a truly massive and impressive volume of evidence 
concerning the, mostly popular, view of Buddhism in Victorian 
England. The references presented in this book should provide a good 
basis for future work. The analysis which accompanies this tremen- 
dous amount of data is almost always interesting and often very 
stimulating and suggestive. The central point of the work, that, as 
Almond observes in the final sentence of the book, "The Victorian 
world in all its diversity, confident of its cultural hegemony, was 
incorporated, and crucially so, in its interpretation of Buddhism," is 
convincingly presented. The reader is persuaded that the West, in 
appropriating the literature and the culture of the East, in turn 
imaginatively created an East and a Buddhism through its reading of 
Eastern literature and culture, and moreover an East and a Buddhism 
which became real through the pressures of the cultural, political and 
military hegemony of the West over that East. 
The whole process; however, was perhaps somewhat more nuanced 
than Almond's presentation makes it seem. In particular, some of the 
presuppositions of Almond himself seem to slant his coverage in 
directions which exaggerate certain extremes. But if in presenting his 
thesis in this exaggerated form Almond draws the reader's attention to 
the idea that ideological sensitivity is vital in any reading of the past, 
as it is also in the present, then this exaggeration has done good 
service. It is always helpful and necessary to ask why someone might 
have said something, or said it in a certain way, and if an answer can 
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only or best be painted in broad, exaggerated strokes, then a more 
refined appreciation can be left for a later time when the task of 
problematizing the issue in the first place has already been accom- 
plished. Future discussions of "orientalism" will, thanks to Almond's 
book, have to deal with Buddhism and its place in the discourse of the 
West. Those future discussions may sometimes produce more nuanced 
evaluations than Almond, as a pioneer, has been able to provide. 
Aside from the many issues he does discuss, there are other 
questions which Almond does not take up but which would be 
interesting to explore. What kind of awareness of Buddhism, for 
example, was there among those who did not go out of their way to 
think about it or write about it? What, in the Victorian and post- 
Victorian worlds, is the broader relation between thinking about 
Buddhism and Hinduism, and "Orientalism" more broadly under- 
stood? It will be interesting to look into these questions in the future. 
But even now, with the materials put at our disposal by Almond it 
should be possible, as I have suggested above, for us as modern 
people interested in Buddhism, whether scholars or not, to examine 
some of our inherited presuppositions, and through this process, it is 
to be hoped, arrive at a more satisfactory basis upon which to rest our 
imaginative reconstructions of the past and our further studies of that 
past. And with the awareness cultivated by Almond's analyses, we 
should be able to uncover motivations in the works of post-Victorian 
writers and scholars which have likewise shaped the way- we see the 
Buddhism of today and that of the past. Almond's book is to be 
welcomed for the materials it presents, the critique it offers, and the 
challenge it lays down to all those who would like to think seriously 
about how to understand the Buddhist traditions. 
I close these few comments on this fine work with the wish for an 
affordable paperback edition of the book which could be assignable 
for classroom use; the present hardback edition, after all a mere 186 
pages, is priced, at s or $34.50, so high that there is no way one 
could ask students to even consider its purchase. This trend toward 
exorbitant pricing should be combated at every opportunity. 
I would fike to take this opportunity to briefly note some minor problems: First, it is 
not clear whv the Alleemeine  Deutxche Real-Encvclor~h'die ir auoted to illustrate viewr 
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held in the English speaking world. Was this work particularly important in Victorian 
England? The arithmetic on page 49 is not clear, because Almond has omitted some 
vital information. Although Sangermano's book was published in 1833, referring to a 
report of 1693 Almond says "a hundred years later, Father Sangermano . . . .  " Forty 
years would seem to be missing somewhere. In fact, according to the preface to the 
original edition of the book by (Cardinal) N. Weisman (see below) and the Lessieo 
universale italiano di lingua lettere arti scienze et tecnica (Roma: Instituto della 
Enciclopedia Italiana, 1978: vol. 20: 4), Sangermano was a Barnabite missionary born 
in Arpino in 1758 who arrived in Rangoon in July, 1783, proceeding immediately to 
Ava but shortly thereafter returning to Rangoon. He arrived back in Italy in 1808. 
His book was written partly in Ava and partly after his return, and he died in 1819. 
This book which, the preface states, contains translations made with the assistance of 
native scholars of "all that is worthy of notice in the three Kiam, the Vini, Padimot 
and Sottan," seems not to have been utilized much by modern Buddhist scholars, 
although Burnouf (Le Lotus de la Bonne Loi [Paris, 1852: 446]) remarks that F. 
Buchanan knew and used it. The book will no doubt well repay further examination. 
On page 95 of Almond's book we find a completely unacknowledged very close 
paraphrase, virtually a quotation, from p. 77 of the first part of de Jong's article 
mentioned in note 6 of the present review. This should have been noted by Almond 
in a footnote. On page 140 we read the following: "In part, at least, this was an aspect 
of the Western creation of two qualitatively different modes of being human, the 
oriental and the occidental, the latter of which was essentially other, and which was in 
most instances perceived as inferior." Is not the order to be reversed? Surely it is the 
former which is "essentially other." 
Finally a few corrections to the Bibliography are needed: The original publication 
of Alexander Cunningham's Bhilsa Topes is: Bombay: Smith, Taylor and Co. and 
London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1854. The correct t ire of Robert Knox's book, and its 
publication information, are: An Historical Relation of the Island Ceylon, in the East- 
Indies, Together with an Account of the Detaining in Captivity the Author and divers 
other Englishmen now Living there and of the Author's Miraculous Escape. London: 
Richard Chiswell, 1681. The odd spelling used repeatedly by Almond, "Ceylone," is 
not attested in the American National Union Catalog or the British Museum General 
Catalogue, nor is it found in the facsimile reprint of the first edition, which is 
accompanied by a very informative introduction by H. A. I. Goonetileke: New Dehli: 
Navrang, 1984. Finally, the correct publication data for the book of "Sangermano" is: 
Vincentius Sangermano, A Description of the Burmese Empire, compiled chiefly from 
native documents by the Rev. Father Sangermano, and translated from his MS by 
William Tandy. Rome: Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1833. 
For the three preceding items Almond has listed only reprint editions, and although 
he states in the text the correct dates of publication, a look at only the bibliographic 
citations could suggest that these books are modern. Especially in studies such as the 
present one, concerned with intellectual history, correct bibliographic information is 
crucial, and should be supplied in all cases. If the author has utilized a reprint edition, 
this should of course be noted, but in addition to the original publication information. 
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* I want to thank Gfiff Fonlk and Luis G6mez for their insightful and very useful 
comments on earlier drafts of this review. 
1 Paris: Aubier, 1952. 
2 p. j. Marshall, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. This book 
appeared under the series rubric "The European Understanding of India," but was 
apparently the only volume of that series to appear. No notation of series appears in 
the present volume, and neither the American National Union Catalog nor the British 
Museum General Catalogue list similar titles beginning with "The British Discovery of 
. . . .  " Marshall's book is mentioned only very much in passing by Almond (p. 70). 
3 It may not be pure chance that La Vall6e Poussin used the word "espbces," given 
the influence of Darwinism on the discourse of the period, a topic discussed by 
Almond. In his discussion La Vall6e Poussin seems to limit himself to the many 
species of Indian Buddhism. In the discussion preceding the phrase quoted above, La 
Vall~e Poussin writes: "Buddhism, then, may be a collection of contemporary or 
consecutive religions, quite distinct in their foundation even though they may reside 
together in the same mind . . . .  But it is yet something else, since these multiple and 
diverse forms of Buddhism are not only joined by the usage of the same symbols and 
the same nomenclature, but more still they are bound, in spite of their difference, by a 
sort of historical progress." Louis de la Vallde Poussin, Bouddhisme: Opinions sur 
l'histoire de la dogmatique. I~tudes sur l'Histoire des Religions 2. Paris: Gabriel 
Beanchesne & C., 1909: 20--21. Almond does not refer to this study or any other 
work of the great Belgian scholar, whose earliest paper was published in 1891. 
4 As an example of an attempt to get beyond old, commonly accepted but actually 
unproven, notions of Buddhist history, see Gregory Schopen, "Two Problems in the 
History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the 
Transference of Merit," Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 10 (1985): 9--47. 
5 In addition to the work of De Lubac, mentioned above, we may note the following, 
some of which are not listed by Almond (the list could be much lengthened): By 
Almond himself we have "The Buddha of Cbmistendom: Review of the Legend of 
Barlaam and Josaphat," Religious Studies 23/3 (Sept. 1987): 391--406, and the (I 
believe) still unpublished "Buddhism in the West: 300 B.C.--A.D. 400," to appear in 
The Journal of Religious History. [[ know this paper only from Almond's reference.] 
An earlier related paper by Almond is "The Medieval West and Buddhism," The 
Eastern Buddhist 19/2 (1986): 85--101, but oddly absent is reference to Almond's 
own "The Buddha in the West: From Myth to History," Religion 16 (1986): 305--22, 
virtually a summary of the present book. Almond has not referred to two papers by 
David A. Scott: "Christian Responses to Buddhism in Pre-Medieval Times," Numen 
32/1 (July 1985): 88--100, and "Medieval Christian Responses to Buddhism," The 
Journal of Religious History 15/2 (Dec. 1988): 165--84. 
6 Perhaps the best introduction to Western academic studies of Buddhism is that 
published serially by J. W. de Jong, "A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe 
and America," The Eastern Buddhist 7/1 (1974): 55--106; 7/2 (1974): 49--82; 
"Recent Buddhist Studies in Europe and America: 1973--1983," The Eastern 
Buddhist 17/1 (1984): 79--107. (The first two have been reprinted in book form in 
India, and translated into Japanese and Chinese.) Despite the titles of these papers, de 
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Jong actually deals almost exclusively with philological studies on Indian Buddhism, to 
the neglect of both Far Eastern Buddhism and religious and sociological studies. No 
comprehensive appreciation of such works exists, although occasionally surveys of, 
for example, recent work on Japanese Buddhism, appear. [De Jong recently published 
"Buddhist Studies 1984--1990" in Chft6 Gakujutsu Kenky~jo Kiy6 20 (1991): 1--60, 
but it is much less useful than his previous surveys.] Guy Richard Welbon discussed 
in detail Western attempts to come to grips with one of the central ideas of Buddhist 
doctrine in The Buddhist Nirvdna and its Western Interpreters. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1968. (See the critique by J. W. de Jong in the Journal of 
Indian Philosophy 1 [1972]: 396--403.) I have not yet been able to see the recent 
study of Andrew P. Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: 
On the Western Interpretation of Ndgdrjuna. Oxford University Press, 1990. Regarding 
the introduction of Buddhism to North America, see for example Rick Fields's How 
the Swans Came to The Lake: A Narrative History of Buddhism in America, Boulder: 
Shambala, 1986, which is rather more documentary than analytical. 
Comparatively less work has been done (at least in Western languages) on the 
history of modern Japanese reflection and research on Buddhism. Silvio Vita has 
published one short article on this subject, "Interpretations of Mah~yfina Buddhism in 
Meiji Japan: From Religious Polemics to Scholarly Debate," Transactions of the 
International Conference of Orientalists in Japan 31 (1986): 44--57, and he is 
currently preparing a detailed study of this and related topics. I also owe to his 
kindness a copy of the recent paper by Jackie Stone, "A Vast and Grave Task: 
Interwar Buddhist Studies as an Expression of Japan's Envisioned Global Role," in 
Culture and Identity: Japanese Intellectuals in the Interwar Years, J. Thomas Rimer, 
ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990: 217--33. 
A question which I believe has not yet been dealt with is the degree of influence 
exercised by Japanese Buddhist thinking on European ideas about Buddhism. It seems 
clear, for example, that some of Max Miiller's impressions about the MahfiyLna must 
have been formed to a considerable extent by his conversations with his students 
Nanj6 Bunyfi (Bunyiu Nanjio) and Kasawara Kenjfi (Kenjiu Kasawara). The ideas he 
got from these two were passed through him to the Western scholarly world. Many 
perspectives of the traditional Japanese understanding of Buddhism reached the West, 
as it were, through this back-door. A study of these influences would be most 
welcome. I may add that I have lately received a copy of a paper presented at the 
1991 American Academy of Religion conference by Robert Sharf, "Occidentalism and 
the Zen of Japanese Nationalism," in which he investigates the ways in which Western 
notions of Zen were shaped by the ideological agendas of pre-war Japanese thinkers, 
most notably D. T. Suzuki. I understand that Sharf's paper will be published in the 
future in a volume on Orientalism to be edited by Donald Lopez. 
7 Although not mentioned by Almond, this process should be considered part of the 
greater movement referred to by Raymond Schwab as the "Renaissance Orientale" in 
his book of the same title. Hubert Durt has observed that "almost all the Buddhist 
converts in Western Europe have been influenced by books . . . .  They remain thus in 
the intellectual tradition of the 'Renaissance Orientale.'" "The Growth of Buddhism in 
the West: Its Reality and Meaning." Buddhism and the Modern World. Seoul: 
Dongguk University, 1977: 87. 
s It is a measure of Almond's concentration on the Indian sub-continent, with some 
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attention to China, that Japan --  which of course was never colonized -- is little 
considered. Almond's general thesis is not necessarily inapplicable to the Japanese 
case, but a more refined treatment would be necessary. One would have to consider 
less blatant forms of ideological control and manipulation against the backdrop of 
Japan's opening to the West. 
9 The case, however, should not be overstated. While it is true, as Almond (p. 25) 
points out, that Klaproth, Schmidt, Csoma de Kr r r s  and others "were seminal in 
establishing the Buddhism of Northern Asia as a textual object," it should not be 
forgotten that these scholars relied heavily on the living, learned traditions of 
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